Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

During a visit to the United States, on July 12, 2011, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov came to the Washington, D.C. studio of the Voice of Russia radio station that opened in May 2011 and gave an interview covering a range of issues in Russian-American and international relations.

– Minister Lavrov, how you would comment on the results of the Mideast Quartet meeting?

– Well, the Quartet met in Washington on July 11. We discussed the situation, which is not very encouraging at the moment because the negotiations have been stuck for almost a year. And we all agreed that we all want the parties to resume the negotiations without any preconditions, but of course respecting the previous agreements and the existing legal basis accepted internationally – these grounds being the Security Council’s resolutions, the European initiative, the road map plan, and the Madrid principles.

The components of the final deal are all there. For the time being, Israel is mostly preoccupied with its security (which is very much understandable). The Palestinians are preoccupied with the fact that for many, many decades they could not have their own state as promised by the international community in the middle of last century. So, the components of the deal, as I said, are in place.

We all understand that the parties would start by discussing specific borders based on the 1967 lines with agreed swaps. The second priority would be Israel’s security. Those two issues are very difficult for obvious reasons, but it is also understood that – while concentrating on them – the parties would not abandon other elements of the final status issues, namely the fate of Jerusalem, the fate of the Palestinian refugees, water resources, and so on. Our discussion showed that we all want them to start; at the same time, we also believe that the Quartet could usefully help the parties to sit down to the negotiating table with a position that we want to negotiate. The elements of this position are almost agreed upon. We need to find the right language because the psychological effect is no less important than the substance sometimes, and this is exactly the case. So we encouraged our experts to continue discussing the language, and we give them instructions on what we want to achieve – the resumption of the negotiations and assuring the parties that the interest of neither of them would be ignored.

– Western countries continue their military operation in Libya while maintaining their call for a new Security Council resolution on Syria and supplying the Libyan opposition with weapons. As we know,  Russia strongly opposes any new resolution on Syria in view of the Libyan experience with U.S. air strikes. But critics of Russia say that Russia supported the dictatorship of Gaddafi. What is your stance on that,  and how would you respond?

– Well, I think these assertions are based on the lack of knowledge of the Russian position. When Gaddafi gave orders to his air force to kill civilians on the ground, we were among the first to condemn this action, and we joined with other members of the Security Council in the first resolution on Libya (number 1970), which called for immediate cessation of hostilities, which authorized a total arms embargo on any supply of weapons to the Libyan territory and which also called for the immediate start of the political process. As I said, this was a resolution adopted by consensus, including of course the Russian vote.

Then, when Gaddafi did not listen to the international community, the second draft was introduced on the basis of the request from the League of Arab States, which wanted the Security Council to authorize a no-fly zone in the Libyan air space, and Russia supported this request. We negotiated the text in the Security Council, which did exactly that, namely declaring the no-fly zone over Libya, but we had problems with the way this resolution described the means to achieve this goal, the paragraph that prevented us from voting in favor, gave a carte blanche to everyone to do anything they want to achieve the purpose of this resolution. We wanted to elaborate on this point, so we could know before the vote who is going to volunteer to implement the authorization of the Security Council, what would be the rules of engagements, in view of the fact that the task of the operation is to create the no-fly zone regime, not to attack the ground targets, including non-military targets.

We wanted to know what would be the limits to the use of force. Unfortunately, co-sponsors rejected our proposal to finalize the negotiations on this paragraph, and they put it to a vote the way it was drafted, which, as I said, prevented us from supporting the resolution. But since we supported the goal but disagreed with the means, we did not use the veto power and abstained together with China, Germany, India, and Brazil.

So, now we unfortunately see that our concerns have been grounded because the way the resolution was being implemented goes far beyond the authorization for the no-fly zone. The no-fly zone regime was tried by the Security Council in the past in Iraq, and it was interpreted unambiguously in a very clear way that the no-fly zone regime involved too legitimate targets: first, the air force of the country in question, if it is in the air space, and second, radars and entire aircraft systems of the country in question, provided that the coalition planes patrolling the no-fly zone are being targeted by these installations.

These two legitimate targets have been used in interpreting the resolution on Iraq. The current resolution is being interpreted by NATO, which volunteered to implement it in the way which is absolutely without any limits. You mentioned the supply of arms  – before that there were instructors from Europe deployed on the ground, and people even talked about a ground operation. The air strikes themselves go well beyond military targets, some residential quarters were hit, and it is a cause of concern because the main goal of the resolution is not to hit the targets with the risk for civilian population, it is exactly the protection of the civilians, who suffer both from Gaddafi forces and the forces of the coalition. So, I think, the recognition that this is not what we all want is gaining ground, and just a couple of days ago discussions were renewed on the need for the political process.

We supported the African Union initiative to start talks between representatives of Tripoli and those of Benghazi transitional national council on the understating that Gaddafi himself of course would not have any place in future Libya and that Gaddafi himself would not participate in those discussions.

We have some encouraging signs that both Tripoli and Benghazi are discussing now specific terms of introducing something like administrative mechanism for preparing the transition. So, we will be only gratified if this succeeds.

President Medvedev repeatedly made initiatives on supporting the mediation efforts on the African Union, the U.N. He met last week with President Zuma of South Africa in Sochi, and President Zuma presented the African Union plan which is very much about creating these interim negotiating administrative mechanisms, which would open the way for full-fledged discussions of the future state of Libya.

– What do you think should become of Muammar Gaddafi?

– Well, we agree, as I said, that he must go, he has no place in the new Libya, and the rest is subject to discussion. And, first of all, it will be for Libyans themselves. I heard the views of Benghazi people expressed informally that they would be prepared to discuss a compromise, whereby Gaddafi would stay at an agreed place, probably in Libya itself, which will be provided with some subsistence. Of course he is under the verdict of the International Criminal Court, but again we have to think not about formalities but about the future of Libya and of the fastest way to stop the violence.

You also mentioned Syria. You know, in any situation we want to promote the political process, we want to promote engagement, not isolation. Of course, President Assad made some mistakes, but unlike Gaddafi, Assad introduced a series of reforms, he cancelled the state of emergency, which had lasted for several decades in Syria, he announced two amnesties of prisoners, he invited the opposition to a national dialogue, which started a couple of days ago and should continue. Many opposition leaders agreed to participate in that dialogue. He also suggested discussing at this national dialogue some very far-reaching reforms – constitutional reforms, electoral legislation reform, the reform of the legislation relating to the media, and the opposition should not ignore this. If the opposition believes that they should reject anything coming from Assad and expect that the Libyan scenario would be repeated, I believe that it is against the interest of the Syrian people and of many neighboring countries, because Syria is a very special place in the Middle East, and it plays a very important role in what happens in Lebanon, what happens with the Kurds in many countries, and what happens in relations between the Shia and the Sunni of the Arab nation.

Actually, I would like for everyone to look on what is going on around Yemen – the situation is no less dire in that country – only to mention the fact that the presidential palace was hit by shells, and the president himself was gravely wounded, as was the prime minister, deputy PM, and speakers of the two chambers of the parliament. But everyone is talking not about condemning one side and supporting another side, but about the dialogue which both the government and the opposition must immediately engage in – this is the unified position of the U.S., of the E.U., Russia, the U.N., the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and I believe the responsible approach would be to use the same position vis-а-vis what is going on in Syria, encourage people to sit down and talk, don’t create illusions for one side that it can count on the military support of the international community – like it happened in Libya.

– We know you are going to meet Hillary Clinton here, and you are going to sign a long-awaited child adoptions agreement. According to the Russian child rights ombudsman, a similar document will be signed with Israel in the near future. Can you explain why Russia insisted on that kind of an intergovernmental agreement, and why did it become important to sign it after decades of living without it?

– I think that in any situation which involves citizens of two or more countries it is necessary to protect them as much as you can. International intergovernmental agreements are a very reliable way to do this. We already signed the agreement on cooperation in the area of adoption with Italy, we are also negotiating one with Israel, and, on the basis of the same principles, we suggested to the U.S. government starting negotiating a similar treaty. The reason for the agreements are the absolutely outrageous facts of humiliation and even murder of Russian children adopted in the U.S., you know about these cases, I think there are almost 20 of them now, some of them are still in court.

Still, the bad treatment of the children in some families continues. Please, understand me correctly – these cases are minimal compared to the entire number of adoptions in the U.S. from Russia, and the number of adoptions is more than one hundred thousand. But this does not make it less important because every life is precious, and we want to be sure that everything a state can do to protect a child in such situations is done.

The U.S. government for quite some time was reluctant to enter negotiations, explaining that in the U.S. those issues are within the competence of the states, not the federal authorities, but I was very gratified when eventually we persuaded our partners to sit down and look at this situation, and we agreed on a treaty that protects Russian kids, that ensures the mechanisms to monitor how they are doing in the families in the U.S. that adopted them, and that also makes sure there will be no so-called independent adoptions. All adoptions would be made through a competent authority, to be designated by the U.S., the federal government, and the states, which would be responsible for checking whether the candidates who adopt a Russian child are psychologically stable and which would also be responsible for making sure that Russian government representatives have access to a child, if necessary. This is all part of the agreement, and I believe it is a fair deal.

– Let’s talk about the Russia-NATO decision to postpone the issue of the European missile defense to the next summit in Chicago. Moscow says that ignoring Russia’s concerns on the European defense system could hurt Russia-NATO ties and possibly lead to a new arms race. Do you think it is still possible to reach an agreement with NATO on this issue?

– First of all, we did not postpone any decision to any particular date; we have not even agreed to have a NATO-Russia summit next year in Chicago. Our NATO partners were mentioning this as a date when it could be possible to meet, but the formal invitation was not issued, and I cannot even think at this moment that we would be ready to reply immediately, for one reason – it is not some artificial deadline, it’s the substance of the agreement on missile defense that must take precedence.

On missile defense, as far as the substance of the matter is concerned, in July 2009, when President Obama visited Moscow, he and President Medvedev issued a joint statement on missile defense, saying that they want their teams to work together to develop a common vision of missile defense, based on common analysis of threats, common design to respond to those threats, and then common efforts to establish technical and military means to be ready for potential threats. And the talks started between Russia and the U.S. Then, after the Lisbon summit last year, a similar exercise began in the Russia-NATO Council, and these discussions continue on both tracks, bilateral and with NATO, but the problem is that, in parallel with those discussions that have not reached results yet, the situation on the ground is being created according to the American national plan of missile defense, which was not accepted by us as a reasonable way to respond to what is perceived as a purpose of the entire system.

So, at the moment we want to stick to the original agreement that we need to have a joint understanding of why we need this missile defense system and where the threats are coming from. If it is from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, as the Americans tell us, why don’t we discuss the criteria, which would guarantee that it is exactly the way it would be constructed and that there would be no parts of the system which would compromise, which would create risks for the strategic stability and for the potential in the strategic stability area of the participants of the system. So, we not only say, as we did in Lisbon, that we do not represent a threat to each other and we are partners, but we also translate this statement into practical arrangements in missile defense. Actually it relates also to a broader issue of the indivisibility of security. In the 1990s, in the NATO-Russia Council, in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the presidents and prime ministers endorsed several statements, saying that security is indivisible and no country in the Euro-Atlantic region would increase its own security at the expense of the security of any other country in this region.

It is a political declaration, a political commitment, but unfortunately it did not work in practical terms, despite the promises to the contrary NATO was expanded in the absence of the Warsaw Treaty.

Despite the commitments to the contrary, military infrastructure was created on the territory of new NATO members, all this was solemnly proclaimed as our common position and as a political commitment. But those commitments have not been respected. So, we believe, and President Medvedev three years ago suggested doing this in the form of the European security treaty, that those commitments must acquire legal force, that they must be implemented in practice, and the situation with missile defense is exactly about the indivisibility of security.

We either have the Euro-Atlantic community united against common threats as the design of the U.S. (as being presented but without any practical translation into real life) or we will create more and more dividing lines in Europe, and we will create in Europe zones with different security level.

So, we need – first – guarantees that no participant of this European missile defense will feel that its security is at risk. The discussions on the criteria to make sure this is the case and that the future missile defense system would be created to protect all of us from threats coming from the outside must continue, so that the necessary criteria are agreed upon in military terms. We are not pessimistic about the entire exercise, though the latest developments certainly do not make us happy. We continue the talks, we did so in Sochi when the NATO-Russia Council held its meeting and President Medvedev talked to the participants, and we will be discussing this with the U.S., and there will be continued discussions between the two militaries.

– You know, it’s been mentioned that Moscow will submit a claim next year to the U.N. to expand its Arctic shelf borders. Other nations,  including the U.S.,  have also increased their activities in the region,  and it is described by some analysts as a new re-division of the Arctic. How do you see the role of Russia in this process,  and does it need to increase its military presence there as the U.S. and Canada did? May the future of the Arctic be resolved peacefully?

– Well, first, there is no such thing as redesigning the Arctic landscape and redesigning the legal regime of the Arctic. The five coastal states, the Arctic Five so to say, back in 2008 agreed during their meeting that there is no single problem in the region that cannot be resolved on the basis of existing law, this law being the international U.N. Convention of 1982.

Then this position was endorsed by the entire Arctic Council, which is composed of eight Arctic states, and the fact that this is really the case was demonstrated by the signature and entry into force of the Russian-Norwegian agreement on de-limitation in the Barents Sea area.

There is no single issue in the area that would require any military presence of the non-regional actors, be it countries or organizations. The Arctic Five, Russia, the U.S., Canada, Norway, and Denmark are perfectly capable of maintaining the necessary level of security, the freedom of shipping and safety of shipping, and we are open to other countries that want to cooperate, but on the basis of the rules of the game established by the Arctic countries.

We met last May in Greenland, in the city of Nuuk, at the Arctic Council ministerial meeting, and we adopted the first pan-Arctic legally-binding agreement on search and rescue, and instructed our experts to draft a treaty on how to fight oil spills. We also endorsed the rules for observers, who want to participate in the work of the Arctic Council, which provides for them to be parties to projects like exploration of oil and gas, transportation of oil, gas, and other commodities through the Northern Sea route, participation in scientific research, and many other activities.

But I would like to emphasize once again that there’s no problem requiring any military involvement in the Arctic. Everything must be and should be done on the basis of the international Convention on the Law of the Sea, and this is a common position of the members of the Arctic Council, including Russia and the U.S.

– How would you describe Russian-U.S. relations right now?

– Well, they are certainly on the rise, and the Obama Administration when it announced the reset of our relations clearly recognized in my view that the policy of the previous Administration was leading us to some very unnecessary confrontational situations.

I want to be understood right, both President Putin, when he was president, and Dmitry Medvedev, when he became the leader of Russia, had very good personal relations with President Bush, but somehow the chemistry from the top didn’t translate into some cooperative efforts on the lower levels. On the contrary, on the lower levels, we felt a confrontational attitude, unnecessary and artificial irritators. But when the Democrats came to the White House, the situation changed.

We have a much more developed and elaborate system of cooperation, which is not based only on very good personal relations between the two presidents. It is structured and systemic. Testimony to that is a successful launching and functioning of the presidential commission, which was created under the two presidents, with the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of Russia being the coordinators of some twenty working groups now.

The last two groups were created on innovations and legal issues. All of them have produced some very meaningful results, and the groups cover any imaginable area of our cooperation, economy, military, environmental, social issues, human rights, etc.

The new approach of the new Administration to American-Russian relations also helped us finalize the very important START Treaty and the 1, 2, 3 agreement on cooperation and peaceful usage of nuclear energy. This is beneficial not only for bilateral relations between Russians and Americans, but also for our joint cooperation in third countries.

So, there are achievements that are not negligible, but there are also challenges ahead. What we want is to concentrate on projects that would promote joint ventures in innovative sectors, and quite a number of American companies are coming to Russia. We also want to take decisions jointly, so that the positive effect of these decisions will be felt by the citizens of our countries.

I would also mention an agreement reached to facilitate the visa regimes, so that Russian and American businessmen and tourists could receive long-term visas, multiple visas, and save time for visiting each other. Also, official travel would be liberalized.

When Vice President Biden was in Moscow in the spring, the Russian side suggested having a more ambitious goal to move towards a visa-free regime. We are negotiating this regime with the E.U., we already have such a regime with almost 100 countries, including Israel, by the way, and we see no reason why we should not put this goal as an immediate task to start working on with the U.S. Two-three years ago this would be unthinkable even to mention that we might have a visa-free regime, but now, I think, it is very realistic.

Of course, we have differences, any two big countries would have something, on which they do not see eye to eye – I mentioned missile defense, there are some other things, but the main feature of this particular period in Russian-American relations is that we do not make too much fuzz out of these differences, but we concentrate on where we can agree, where we can achieve result.

Still, we also discuss in an open and friendly manner the things, on which we differ, and I am sure that this approach is the only way to proceed. We would not ever agree on each and every coma in our positions, but, as we concentrate on the things that still divide us, we reduce the list of such items, we add to the positive agenda, and this is the way to proceed.