- Prior to the anniversary of the tragic events in South Ossetia, we observed some curious changes in the assessment of those events. These changes, of course, occurred outside Russia. For example, Mikhail Saakashvili recently conceded his defeat, and NATO chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that neither Ukraine nor Georgia is ready to join NATO and that neither is likely to be ready for it soon. What do you think is causing this shift – political realities, actual conditions in the world, or is history putting everything in its place?
- I think there’s a little bit of everything here. Of course, it is impossible to get away from reality. People have long since understood the reality, but are only now openly acknowledging it. That is not an easy step for those who did not side with the truth and justice during the aggression against South Ossetia – those who supported ideology and bloc politics. NATO members proved to be among the latter. The Alliance was on the side of those denying the truth, and NATO imbibed the lies of Tbilisi and embraced the old templates – the Cold War templates – by defending a man upon whom they made high bets. It turned out that the man had simply let them down by carrying out an unforgivable gamble that cost hundreds of lives. Strictly speaking, it became a tragedy for Georgia itself and for the Georgian people, whom we greatly respect and with whom no one will ever cause us to quarrel – neither Saakashvili nor those who did and still support him now.
The true facts were known immediately when the events unfolded. On August 7 the OSCE observers in Ossetia and Georgia were reporting to their headquarters in Vienna about the large amassment of Georgian troops and Georgian military equipment near the borders of South Ossetia. On August 8 they reported that Tskhinval was fired on during the night from beyond the conflict zone – which could only be from the territory of Georgia – particularly by the Grad volley-fire systems and artillery. At the end of August of last year the chief U.N. observer in Abkhazia came forward with his appraisal of the situation. Moreover, this took place at a meeting of all those countries that sent their observers to the U.N. Mission in Abkhazia. The appraisal clearly showed the military invasion of Abkhazia was prepared in advance.
The United Nations heard testimony that the Russian military acted solely against the military targets of the Georgian army. These considerations were set out in an internal U.N. report in early September. There was no doubt left as to who had started it all. The blame was laid upon Saakashvili for the outbreak of hostilities in South Ossetia - for the attack on South Ossetia - and for the preparation of an analogous scenario for Abkhazia. Those who spoke to the contrary during this one-year period were, to put it softly, telling “untruths” and doing so for the sake of their ideological ambitions. The Saakashvili project was obviously an ideological one, a virtual one, and it failed completely. But then who wants to admit that your own creation let you down so miserably?
- Will a seal of finality be put to the assessment of those events after the publication of Heidi Tagliavini’s report?
- I hope that this diplomat – I’ve known her for a long time, and she is a responsible and decent person – will honestly approach the performance of her functions and give to the European Union, which created this mission, an objective picture of what happened.
- A year ago the Russian Foreign Ministry was also on the forward edge of the lines of fire, since the political attacks on Russia were hardly less furious than the military attacks on South Ossetia. How have the Ministry’s assessments changed since then? Where were you right, and where did you go wrong? What could have been done differently?
- At the moment when the Georgian army attacked South Ossetia, we were thinking of only one thing: how to prevent the loss of life of innocent civilians, of our citizens and how to secure our peacekeepers who found themselves to be the target of Georgian heavy armor with their light weapons. We acted swiftly to save people. Together with the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces we promptly began to supply up-to-date information to the outside world on how the events were unfolding. But of course, it was not easy for us to spread objective coverage of the conflict – we do not have the media capabilities available to those who decided to take Saakashvili’s side. Still, I think that we could have used foreign media outlets with worldwide coverage more actively. We fell slightly short of what was needed, although, I will repeat myself, first and foremost, we did not think about how and what the world was going to think of us, but about saving the people. Immediately after the completion of active hostilities, after the President of Russia gave the order to end the peace-enforcement operation as its objectives were accomplished, we took up the tasks of stabilizing and and normalizing the region. That included the well-known Medvedev-Sarkozy plan, which was being prepared literally “on the wheels,” when the French President, who was the head of the European Union, arrived in Moscow. That was quite an act. It was prompted by the same considerations that the Russian Federation pushed forward in a bid to stabilize the situation and to prevent the resumption of the conflict, as well as to ensure that the Georgian army does not try to get drawn into this gamble again.
Next came the many discussions in the OSCE, where the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan was approved despite the fact that Saakashvili had done everything to distort the content of the plan. Let me recall that in Moscow the Russian and the French Presidents endorsed six principles and prefaced them with a preamble, the first phrase of which said that the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the French Republic support the positions set out in the plan and call on the parties to sign on to them. It follows unequivocally that France, both in its national capacity and as the President of the European Union, did not consider Russia as a party at fault in the conflict. Russia and France put forward the initiative and called on other parties – Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia – to sign on to these principles, above all, to the principle of the nonuse of force. Saakashvili insisted on the removal of this first phrase from the paper he signed. Since then he has continuously been saying that Russia is a party and is obliged to fulfill those very same principles. But it is primarily he, Mr. Saakashvili, who must fulfill them as the man who “stirred up all this trouble” and created so many problems for the region, particularly in geopolitical terms, because the geopolitical changes are evident.
- Do you think the information war has ended?
- No, it is continuing. We periodically, although with much lesser regularity now, hear the statements that Russia must recognize the territorial integrity of Georgia and pull its troops from Georgian territory – a phrase used to refer to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These are echoes of the old way of thinking, the moans of those who, despite the realities that have been long since understood by everyone, try to sting us, to create irritants for us and to save a completely bankrupt regime. I think that’s inertia. The inertia will pass – what happened is irreversible. We did not want to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia when we had stopped the Georgian aggression. Moreover, in the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan which, was agreed upon in Moscow, we ourselves suggested that the international discussions that have now begun in Geneva should among other things focus on the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We suggested considering the status in an international forum. When President Sarkozy brought this plan to Tbilisi, Saakashvili struck out from it not only the first phrase I’ve mentioned, which unequivocally showed that Russia is not a party to the conflict, but also insisted on removing the status issue from the agenda of international discussions. Everything then became clear to us, and we made the decision that we did. Following the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan came a fresh string of bellicose calls from Tbilisi.
The recognition by Russia of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was not a planned move. We had thought primarily of saving people, but then we saw that for saving the people it was not enough to halt the aggression and leave them as a part of Georgia. Under Saakashvili the survival of the peoples of these two republics would unequivocally be endangered.
- In your opinion, how long will the Georgian issue continue to cause problems between Russia, Europe, and the United States?
- The latest discussions with our western partners really show that they have a different position on Georgia. But there are no longer any emotional outbursts. The Georgian issue does not hinder our relationship anymore. This was also borne out during the visit of President Barack Obama. The Georgia issue had no effect whatsoever on the important decisions that were reached. I hope that the plans set out in our agreements will be accomplished and that the administration of President Obama will be guided by what we agreed on in Moscow. We regard attempts from inside this administration to drag us all back into the past – like the one by Vice President Joe Biden – as abnormal. His interview recently published in the Wall Street Journal is reminiscent of speeches by leading officials in the George Bush administration. But the answer to the question of whether the U.S. should follow the old course in its foreign policy was supplied by the American people themselves during last year’s elections.
Speaking of Vice President Biden’s visit to Georgia, the account of how he met with Georgian children and among other things advised them to follow President Saakashvili’s example is stuck in my memory. I think that was a very bad piece of advice. I hope that the children who now live in Georgia, and in general the Georgian youth that in some time will occupy leading positions in Georgian political, economic, and cultural life will after all be responsible people. Only through truly democratic procedures will Georgia receive the expression of the will of its people - the country needs sane politicians who think primarily about the interests of their nation, and this always entails the ability to live in peace, harmony, and respect with one’s neighbors.
As to relations with the European Union, President Sarkozy’s leadership of the EU during the period of Georgian aggression really showed his courage, responsibility, and the qualities of a global politician. The Medvedev-Sarkozy plan continues to be the most serious stabilizer of the situation. Along with the presence of Russian troops under intergovernmental agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the presence of EU observers in Georgia’s areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an important stabilizing factor too. We support that presence. Of course, Saakashvili will try to undermine the situation by the most diverse methods. His call for the United States to join the European Union Mission is a case in point. First, this is simply an incorrect assertion because the EU Mission operates under the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreements. Second, the idea is abundantly clear, and we honestly told this to our U.S. colleagues. This is all about dragging Americans into Georgia and pitching U.S. observers against the Russian military. After that, the Georgian masters of provocation, of whom Saakashvili has enough, will try to do their traditional job. The risks of this are clear, and both Europe and the United States understand them. Let this politician, who has outlived his usefulness, stay in his presidential seat as long as the Georgian people allow him to, although, of course, the issue of whether the aggressor has the moral right to remain the head of what he says is a democratic state is a controversial one. But then again it’s up to the Georgian people to decide.
We worked with the European Union from the first days of the crisis. Although there were small pauses in relations, caused primarily by the stance of certain EU member-countries, those differences were successfully overcome. Work has been resumed on a new framework Strategic Partnership Agreement. Two successful summits were held, one in Nice, in the autumn of last year, the second in Khabarovsk, in May of this year. These summits have shown that we’ve got other thing on our agenda apart from what the Georgian leader is trying to impose on us. We have something to engage in on behalf of Russia and the EU member-countries.
- We have no diplomatic relations with Georgia, so it is possible to travel to Georgia only through other countries. Does everything depend on Saakashvili? Can something be undertaken to try and stabilize the situation for the resumption of diplomatic relations with that country?
- We did not break off diplomatic relations. Saakashvili did. He also tore up the agreements for the peaceful settlement of the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia that were concluded in the early 90s and endorsed by the U.N. and OSCE. We didn’t want to sever our relations and were certain that after what had happened, contacts were indispensable. It is necessary to understand how to live further after what has happened. The independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a new reality. We were ready to help the Georgian side forge normal relations with the South Ossetians and the Abkhaz people, to do what none of the Georgian leaders after the breakup of the Soviet Union have seriously been occupied with – from Gamsakhurdia to his worthy follower Mikhail Nikolayevich Saakashvili. Saakashvili is not the Georgian people, and far from everybody in Georgia shares his philosophy on creating constant tension in relations with Russia. There is civil society, under the auspices of which contacts are continuing. Scientists and artists still communicate between themselves. We allot a special role to relations between the Russian and Georgian Orthodox Churches. Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II has repeatedly spoken in favor of normal relations. There was a delegation of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Moscow recently. The pilgrimage of Russians to Georgia and of Georgians to Russia is being planned. This is a very big factor that underscores the spiritual, cultural, and humanitarian unity of our peoples. I am certain that this factor will ultimately prevail.