Intervention was necessary?

Russian politicians offer comments on the first anniversary of military operations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, balancing the positive and the negative factors that have become more clearly discernible with the passage of time.

Intervention was necessary

Andrey Vorobyev, Chairman of the United Russia Party Executive Committee and Deputy Leader of the United Russia faction in the State Duma:

In my view, the greatest accomplishment today is that the two republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia live in peace. The citizens and the families can be certain about their future and do not have to worry for their lives. This was not so in the past. In the past, constant military provocations on the part of Georgian authorities made the situation very tense. I believe that the intervention of Russia was necessary because we could not have remained indifferent to the fate of the people who reside in these two republics – they are like brothers to us.

I cannot say that we lost the information war. Most importantly, we were speaking the truth at all times. We were telling about real events. Our information was verifiable.

The diplomatic blockade of Russia failed utterly

Nikolay Levichev, Leader of the Just Russia faction in the State Duma:

The assault that Georgia mounted against South Ossetia was a horrendous and a deeply cynical act. It was a demonstration of personal ambitions of a presumptuous man who put in jeopardy the survival of an entire people. Today, just like a year ago, it is clear that Russia had no choice but to intervene in this conflict. Russia did not have a right to sit still. Our boys were risking their lives to defend civilians.

I further think that we acted correctly in recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This decision created the necessary conditions for these republics to stop being places of misery. Now civil society can develop in these republics.

Another important factor is that the attempted diplomatic blockade of Russia failed utterly. Some of our so-called partners really wished to isolate us diplomatically. Today, in spite of the differences in the assessment of events in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia continues its joint projects with NATO and the United States.

The recognition of sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was not necessary

Sergey Mitrokhin, Chairman of the Yabloko party and Moscow City Duma Deputy:

- I think that we most definitely had to intervene in the conflict. On another note, the scale of our intervention should have been less extensive. From my standpoint, we did not have to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia because this act contradicts the positions our country has taken on a number of other international issues. This recognition even goes against the foreign policy interests of Russia itself. At the same time, international experts have confirmed that it was Saakashvili who provoked the aggression. Even the people of Georgia understand it now. The Georgian opposition calls for the resignation of Saakashvili on the basis of his incitement of violence in South Ossetia. On the whole, however, Russia’s actions were excessive. In our efforts to put down aggression, we could have limited our losses on the international arena if our political and diplomatic leadership acted with greater skill.

The war changed nothing

Vladimir Milov, cochairman of the Solidarity movement:

- It is first and foremost very clear that this region should never have been militarized and that we should not have allowed the tension to escalate as high as it did. This applies with equal force to the Russian and to the Georgian sides. The war has not changed anything. The region is still being militarized. We can also see that tensions are again running high. Russia’s intervention did not stop the threat of a new conflict. Militarization and the use of force from both sides, including Russia’s side, is bad and does not solve any problems. Problems can be resolved only through the demilitarization of the region and the removal of troops. Talks on the status of the territories with the participation of international intermediaries should be organized. International peacekeepers should also be an option. The methods that the two sides were trying to use to address the question – Georgia used force to capture the republics, and Russia replied with the use of force as well – did not solve the problem. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not worth anything diplomatically. This recognition did not give any real diplomatic advantages to the two republics. It is clear that to achieve standing on the international arena South Ossetia and Abkhazia need to have their independence acknowledged by more countries. It was our unilateral action that hurt their chances. Instead of trying to search for multilateral ways of resolving the conflict, we have tried to solve it alone. We have pumped great resources there – in terms of financial assistance, military equipment, as well as qualified personnel. These measures, however, do not ease tension. The effectiveness of Russia’s actions to create peace is small.

The esteem of Russia grew in the eyes of countries that have not fallen into America’s sphere of influence

Ivan Melnikov, First Deputy Chairman of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] Central Committee and Vice Speaker of the State Duma:

In my opinion, the results of the past year following Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia were positive – with regards to the policy goals in the Caucuses. We should highlight several key events that took place here.

First, Russia had the will required to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The recognition instantly cooled any military ambitions that Georgia had. The peaceful atmosphere in the region is disadvantageous to the aims of the Western aggressors who were feeding and still continue to feed the regime of Mikhail Saakashvili.

Second, Russia was able to steer away from the information ambush that the Western media set up. Even the pro-American members of the international community are no longer claiming that Russia initiated the aggression. While foreign countries refuse to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, they have acquiesced in Russia’s recognition of independence. This was also important. We showed that we were able to end this issue as we wanted. Russia strengthened its esteem in the eyes of nations that have not yet fallen into the sphere of influence of the United States – of nations that are looking for an alternative. Over the course of this year we hosted a series of discussions with countries in Latin America, South America, Asia, and even Africa. The events in the Caucuses have also prompted practical developments concerning the issues of security inside the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The third point is that the reconstruction efforts in South Ossetia have progressed rapidly. We completed the work at more than 70 different infrastructural objects. I also should note that on the initiative of the Communist Party, the Russian State Duma adopted a joint resolution to commemorate the events of last year’s war. We continue to insist that foreign nations give a due assessment to the barbaric acts of Georgia. Failing to recognize the commission of crimes against humanity is almost equivalent to being an accomplice to those crimes. One cannot just leave it like that. If this illicit collusion recedes into history, it would be a permanent scar on the face of our civilization. We are also committed to the principles of the United Nations. Russia will be prepared to defend its historic positions and protect its citizens, regardless of what countries they live in.

It doesn’t hurt for the army to achieve yet another victory

Vitaliy Ivanov, vice president of the Center for the Political Situation:

The results are not favorable to only one side. Let me begin with the negatives. We were obligated to take under our protection the republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We are spending more money on these republics today than we were before. The lives of the people were lost. We also lost several units of very expensive military equipment. Most significantly, from the perspective of international law and global politics, a number of problems have emerged for us. We cannot solve these difficulties right away. Still, I think that the plus factors outweigh the minuses. The decision to begin the war and the victory that Russia achieved resonated well with the public sentiment. The country wanted to go to war, the country wanted for Saakashvili to be hit on the head. We saw the patriotic consolidation of society with the government at its center. The war and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are perceived by the citizens as a positive achievement of the government led by President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. Moreover, Russia demonstrated to the political community of the Caucuses and the global community its resolve to stand up for its interests in the region. We made it clear that we viewed this area as a zone of our state interest, which we would be ready to defend with military force. We sent a message to the political elites in the Caucuses, and I am sure that they understood it. Also, it doesn’t hurt for the army to achieve yet another victory. Of course, in this situation, our adversary was very small, but a victory is always encouraging.

Lastly, the war dealt a significant blow to those members of the political society who were hoping for a thaw. I am talking about the liberal democrats who are sometimes referred to as being anti-patriotic. When the war began, patriotic sentiment rose up and threw a large gravestone onto the liberals. In spite of what they would do or say, they will always be branded as defeatists and enemies of Russia. For some time after the events in Georgia they went on muttering their assent, but it was pointless by then, the train had left the station.

We took the weight of the neck of Saakashvili and placed it onto ours

Dmitriy Oreshkin, independent political expert:

If we consider long-range goals of Russia, the results are, in large measure, negative. But there are also short-term interests of the elites. For the supporters of hardliner war hawks, Russia’s victory is beneficial. Russia rose up from its knees and made a counterstrike against global imperialism and the pro-American Georgia. The country extended its territorial control. These are all symbolic war trophies. Nevertheless, they are significant because the approval ratings of Putin and Medvedev depend on them. In reality, however, Russia’s losses have been heavy. But these are long-term capital losses that other people will have to pay for. I speak first and foremost about the losses to Russia’s reputation. Russia is once again retreating to the position of, if not a rogue state, then at least a peripheral one. Apart from Nicaragua and Venezuela, no states have recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This is a slap on the face to Russia. It also shows that Russia’s influence on the countries of the C.I.S. is very limited. Russia’s difficulties with pipeline plans are also the result of the conflict. The South Stream project has been set back significantly. The entire situation reduces the world’s confidence in Russia as a reliable energy partner. Europe is looking for alternative routes to ensure its energy security.   

Russia placed a great many trump cards into the hands of its rivals, ill-wishers, and competitors. What did Russia get in return? The two liberated territories are a real black hole that requires significant resources. I think that we just took the weight off Saakashvili’s neck and placed it onto ours.

These are the excesses of state formation on the debris from the crash of the Soviet empire

Sergey Markedonov, Chief of the Department of Problems of Interethnic Relations at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis:

Now, a year later, it is necessary to understand the trends in the context of which this five-day war became possible. The problem is not with the one who fired the first shot, but with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. This disintegration did not mean the end of history. It became the beginning of the formation process for new nations. It soon became apparent that it was practically impossible to preserve the states according to the boundaries artificially charted during the Soviet period. It is one thing to call your country Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, or Ukraine formally. It is quite another to build a real state. In early 1990s, we saw the first wave of ethnic conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia and Abkhazia. These conflicts were temporarily frozen. It was the decision to modify the settlements of these earlier conflicts that prompted the violence last August. The putsch in South Ossetia began in 2004, and last year’s events are merely an attempt to revise the outcome of the struggles that took place more than a decade before. These are the excesses of state formation on the debris from the crash of the Soviet empire.

Did Russia win or lose? I would not say that this was a complete victory. Of course, in purely military terms, we defeated Georgia, but every conflict implicates other areas of concern besides those of the military. Earlier, the main task was to keep conflicts frozen and to preserve the status quo. Now, we got a myriad of problems that are qualitatively different from those that we had before. Russia’s position of an underwriter of self-determination for South Ossetia and Abkhazia is not as simple as it may appear. The more distant in time that the Georgian factor becomes, the more questions will come to the forefront for Russia.

Furthermore, this is the primary example of ethnic self-determination that other states may wish to emulate. I am not a supporter of the theory that some kind of self-determination for Chechnya and Tatarstan will inevitably follow. Still, it does carry precedential value. This is a bomb that may explode at any minute. Then again, it might not.