During the Munich Conference in 2023, the RAND Corporation published an expert report on the prospects for U.S.-Chinese and U.S.-Russia security cooperation. The report finds that while there is some potential for cooperation between the U.S., China, and Russia on certain national security issues, the prospects are generally limited.

President Joe Biden’s recent trip to Ukraine and Poland highlights the challenges of a new era of simultaneous and sometimes intertwined confrontations between the U.S. and its nuclear rivals, Russia and China.

President Biden’s visit to Kyiv and his speech in Warsaw reinforced Western support for Ukraine. For his part, President Putin has presented the conflict in Ukraine as part of a broader existential battle against the West in his annual address.

Amid this widening conflict, China is playing its own strategic game. Beijing has sent its top diplomat, Wang Yi, to Moscow for high-level talks, even amid the Sino-American feud over spy balloons and despite U.S. warnings not to send weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine.

CNN reported that the U.S. is facing foreign policy crises with its former Cold War adversaries in the Kremlin and its militant new superpower rival, led by Xi Jinping. Both Russia and China are not formally allied against the U.S. but can harm U.S. interests by working together to advance their own agendas. When President Biden talked about a global rivalry between democracies and autocracies, it seemed theoretical, but it is now a reality. During the Munich Conference 2023, the RAND Corporation published a report that concluded that the prospects for U.S.-Chinese and U.S.-Russian security cooperation are slim. The researchers examined potential cooperation on 22 national security issues in Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East, and Global Issues to formulate more generalized questions for which bilateral or trilateral cooperation may be more likely, as China and Russia may not share or help achieve U.S. goals.

Measuring prospects for cooperation

Prospects for cooperation rely on the intersection of interests. Security issues are often intricate and multifaceted. It is rare for state interests to completely coincide. Nonetheless, cooperation is based on self-interest, and the closer the alignment of state interests, the more probable it is that they will cooperate on a specific topic. Cooperation also hinges on each country’s stakes, or how significant the national security issue is.

Following the identification of a list of questions by geographic region, researchers evaluated the possibility of cooperation by examining U.S., Chinese, and Russian positions on each issue. To do so, they analyzed a range of official policy documents, public statements, and English-, Chinese-, and Russian-language scholarly and political analyses on each issue. The team initially planned to interview key government, academic, and political experts in eight countries in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East – including China and Russia – about the prospects for cooperation. Due to COVID-19, however, only the Middle East field study in Israel and Jordan was completed before the global travel ban.

Measuring cooperation prospects in the Indo-Pacific region

The Indo-Pacific region is the center of the great power rivalry, with Russia and China being the two largest Asian countries, and the United States having significant military forces and strategic interests in the area. However, the prospects for U.S.-China cooperation on national security issues in this region are limited.

Issues in the Indo-Pacific region that can promote cooperation include:

1. Maintaining a peaceful and open regional order
2. Building and sustaining regional alliances
3. Enhancing strategic partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam
4. Resolving China-Taiwan sectarian differences
5. Achieving the denuclearization of North Korea
6. Combating terrorism and violent extremism in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia
7. Defining India’s strategic orientation and role in the region

The United States, China, and Russia may share a common interest in a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region governed by the rule of law. However, there is little common ground between them. Russia and China view the U.S. goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific as advancing American hegemonic interests, while the United States sees China and Russia’s actions as seeking to enhance their interests and power at the expense of others. There is no obvious opportunity for cooperation between China and Russia, as they share similar worldviews, and cooperation with one of them would likely be at the expense of the other.

Promoting and maintaining regional alliances

In a world of alliances with zero-sum games, there is little room for cooperation between the U.S., China, and Russia. For China and Russia, American alliances are at best an obstacle to be overcome, if not a mortal threat. Thus, any American policy aimed at strengthening these alliances is likely to be in direct conflict with Chinese and Russian interests, leaving little room for real cooperation, except at the tactical level.

Expanding strategic cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam

Regarding Southeast Asia, American, and Russian interests do not entirely diverge. The United States would prefer these countries to purchase weapons from the United States or its allies, but the sale of Russian weapons to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam is still indirectly in American interests, as these weapons are likely to be directed against Chinese troops.

Russian-owned corporations are cooperating with Vietnamese mining companies along China’s self-declared Nine-Dotted Line in the South China Sea, indicating that Russia may be willing to pursue its economic interests, even if they run counter to China’s preferences. However, Russia’s willingness to challenge China is limited. Russia has not explicitly supported China’s claim to the Nine-Dotted Line, but it has deliberately avoided taking sides with Vietnam and refused to mediate the dispute when Vietnam asked for it.

Settlement of differences between China and Taiwan

The Chinese government has consistently stated its commitment to the unification of Taiwan with mainland China, making cooperation between the great powers on the issue of Taiwan’s final status unlikely. While Russia has improved its relationship with Taiwan, its relationship with China is still more important, and it has not shown any signs of aligning with the U.S. position on Taiwan. The only possibility for cooperation between the powers on Taiwan would be to prevent accidental conflict over the issue.

Achieving denuclearization of North Korea

Although all three powers are believed to prefer the denuclearization of North Korea, China, and Russia have taken limited steps towards this goal, such as signing U.N. Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea. However, these powers have often delayed or weakened such measures, and applied sanctions unevenly, sometimes only under intense U.S. pressure. Both Beijing and Moscow favor stability through denuclearization and are calling for concessions from the U.S. in order to step back from its demand for a full, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. Given these differences in goals, the U.S. is better served by focusing on more tactical objectives, such as collaborating with China to secure North Korea’s nuclear weapons in case of the regime’s collapse.

Counterterrorism and violent Islamism in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia

Cooperating with China or Russia directly in the fight against terrorism in Asia, and especially in Afghanistan, is challenging to envision. China’s ongoing repression in Xinjiang and the politicization of counterterrorism for domestic purposes make such collaboration even more unlikely. Nonetheless, China and Russia have sent troops to Afghanistan in the past, and if the United States withdraws from the country, China and/or Russia may have to play a more significant role in stabilizing the region for their own interests. However, China and Russia are unlikely to continue the U.S. efforts to promote democracy and human rights in Afghanistan, and there are indications that they might even cooperate with Afghan insurgents.

Strategic orientation of India

From the U.S. perspective, although Russia does not want India to be a U.S. ally or a democracy stronghold, Russia’s willingness to sell advanced weapons to India offers an opportunity for tacit cooperation to strengthen India against China. Traditionally, the U.S. opposed India’s procurement of Russian weapons and threatened sanctions. Still, it could opt not to oppose such sales, making India a more robust military rival to China. Nonetheless, this would come at the expense of undermining the U.S. sanctions against Moscow.

Stability and peace processes in the Middle East

This is an area where Russia and, to a lesser extent, China could potentially cooperate with the United States on major security issues. Although China and Russia aim to diminish U.S. influence in the region, all three powers seek to stabilize conflicts in the Middle East. Specifically, all three are interested in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, stabilizing and rebuilding Syria, and ensuring U.S.-Russian military coordination in Syria. Although they support these interests to varying degrees, cooperation is complicated by various obstacles and dependent on changing conditions and future U.S. policy choices, such as the approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Counteraction to Iran and its supporters

While China and Russia maintain a cooperative relationship with Iran, there is potential for collaboration with Russia and, to a lesser extent, China in countering Iran’s activities.

First, neither Russia nor China supports a nuclear-armed Iran. They have worked together in international efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear program, even though China opposed the U.S. sanctions regime. Their efforts to uphold the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action indicate that they still do not want Iran to possess nuclear weapons and may be open to renewed cooperation if the U.S. sticks to its post-withdrawal approach.

Second, there is a possibility of limiting the export of some modern weapons and military technologies to Iran through collaboration with China and Russia. Both countries have occasionally restricted arms sales to Iran and adhered to U.N. sanctions, although China has been reluctant to do so.

Third, there may be room for tactical cooperation with Russia in countering Iran’s network of proxies, which threatens to undermine Russia’s influence in post-conflict Syria. In the past, Russia has pledged to keep Iranian forces out of the buffer zone in Syria near the borders of Israel and Jordan (although with limited success) and has passively allowed Israeli strikes against Iranian affiliates in Syria.

Broader Euro-Atlantic security

There is no acceptable space for cooperation with either Russia or China that could advance U.S. interests in a key pillar of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture – the future of NATO. However, there is some potential for cooperation to reduce the risk of unintended escalation between NATO and Russia, based on existing or alternative conventional arms control instruments and confidence– and security-building measures.

Security of the Baltics

There is no room for cooperation when it comes to the primary U.S. goal of preventing Russian aggression and limiting Russian influence in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Based on a mutual interest in reducing the likelihood of unintentional conflict between Russia and NATO countries, cooperation with Russia may be possible concerning deconfliction measures or escalation management.

Balkan security and strategic orientation

There is little room for cooperation with China or Russia to eliminate most of the sources of instability in the Balkan region or to better integrate the Balkan countries into Western institutions, as neither competitor shares enough of the same goals. A somewhat speculative but noteworthy area of potential cooperation with Russia could be the stabilization of the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. It depends on Serbia’s willingness to seek U.S. help to normalize relations with Kosovo, in which case Russia can cooperate so as not to lose influence on its close partner, Serbia.

Regional role and strategic orientation of Turkey

As both China and Russia want to push Turkey further away from NATO and the West, there is no prospect of cooperation to advance key U.S. interests in Turkey. A relatively narrow trade space may exist for U.S.-Russian cooperation to reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, European regions where Russia and Turkey are most likely to be involved in dangerous incidents that risk drawing NATO into them. However, Russia’s willingness to cooperate in this regard is relatively low.

Future of Ukraine

While there is no room for cooperation with Russia on the final vision for Ukraine’s future (i.e., the prospects for its membership in the EU or NATO), there is potential to work together on promoting conflict resolution based on the Minsk II agreements. There is also a prospect for cooperation on more modest goals, such as reducing hostilities and mitigating the worst humanitarian consequences of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and minimizing the possibility of escalation or spillover of the conflict.

Preserving freedom of access to Space

The United States, China, and Russia all have significant interests in space, including issues such as space debris that could pose a threat to space exploration. The United States collaborates with both powers in the realm of civil space usage and has long-term partnerships with Russia on projects such as the International Space Station. However, all three countries are also aiming to maintain a powerful space capability and unobstructed access to this realm for both commercial and military purposes, while denying it to their adversaries. Consequently, cooperation in space in the future may be restricted.

Combatting transnational criminal organizations/networks

Transnational crime inflicts human and economic damage on all nations, but China’s cooperation in this regard is often transactional, and experts are skeptical of its commitment to ending the sale of fentanyl abroad. Russia’s willingness to cooperate with the U.S. has also been controversial.

Countering violent extremist organizations

As with transnational crime, translating shared interest into cooperation on this issue has proven difficult. Cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in the fight against terrorism may be somewhat more feasible than with China, but still difficult due to disagreements over who constitutes terrorists and how to combat terrorism. Therefore, while the U.S. and Russia can coordinate and de-conflict their counterterrorism efforts at the operational level, comprehensive cooperation is unlikely.

Promoting global stability

The goal of greater global stability is shared by the United States, China, and Russia, but they have different approaches to achieving it. The U.S. sees China’s and Russia’s support for autocratic regimes as counterproductive, while China and Russia view the U.S.’s promotion of democracy and human rights, and military intervention as destabilizing and interfering with state sovereignty. However, China’s increasing involvement in peacekeeping may offer a chance for future cooperation. With Russia, the U.S. could work together to promote global stability, but trust between the countries has eroded, and their strategic priorities conflict, limiting the potential for cooperation.

Keeping access to air and sea space

In principle, the U.S., China, and Russia want their citizens and goods to move freely through these shared spaces and exploit resources located in the maritime sphere. On air and maritime issues, there are opportunities for cooperation with Russia and China, particularly on common threats like piracy in Somalia, and regions of mutual interest such as the Horn of Africa. However, beyond a few issues and specific areas, each power’s strategic and economic interests restrict the potential for cooperation.

Preventing a nuclear arms race

As the two major nuclear powers, the U.S. and Russia have a history of cooperating on nuclear arms control and nuclear security, as well as a long history of mutual distrust. The U.S. has increasing complaints about Russia’s violations of existing agreements. Nuclear security could become another promising area of cooperation as both countries share concerns about the potential for nuclear materials to fall into the hands of malicious non-state actors or third countries with inadequate security protocols.

China has been hesitant to engage in arms control discussions.

Preventing the militarization of the Arctic

There is a disparity in the willingness and capability of the three countries to collaborate in the Arctic. Although China is increasingly interested in exploiting Arctic resources and its shipping routes, its influence over Arctic policies remains limited. Russia aims to retain its economic rights over the Northern Sea Route, secure its territory and nuclear potential, and protect its sovereign territories. Although there may be opportunities to work with Russia on environmental conservation, scientific research, and search and rescue missions in the Arctic, larger issues are likely to remain complicated.

Maintaining an open cyberspace

This domain is where the great powers have the most intense competition, and prospects for collaboration are slim and would necessitate significant investments. Essentially, the three countries disagree on how to regulate cyberspace. Russia and China consider control over cyberspace crucial for their survival and as a potent and cost-effective weapon against the United States.

Growing barriers to cooperation

RAND experts contend that even when interests align on an issue, it does not necessarily translate to the countries’ choosing to collaborate. International cooperation frequently faces several hurdles, some of which are more formidable than others.

Capacity, structural constraints, and legal constraints may be resolved by modifying a country’s investment priorities, adjusting organizational structures, and/or changing laws, which may be more difficult in democracies than in autocracies but still achievable.

Obstacles related to issues and definitions may be settled through negotiation and narrowing the scope of topics under discussion. Audience costs and third-party barriers are more challenging to address, as they require leaders to gain support from external partners.

Perhaps the most arduous hurdle to overcome is distrust, which is fueled by the perception of the adversary. International institutions may help alleviate this trust deficit, but they have thus far been unsuccessful. As trust between the United States, Russia, and China erodes (and vice versa), the distrust barrier will become more significant, making it much more difficult to overcome other barriers and less likely for future cooperation.

Positive and negative second-order effects

Cooperation among nations is sometimes considered an end in itself. This perception is based on both the moral conviction that peaceful interaction between countries is better than hostility, and on the strategic assumption that international cooperation is necessary for addressing the world’s most complicated challenges. However, RAND’s analysis suggests that cooperation for its own sake is unlikely to significantly advance important U.S. interests.

One of the most significant geopolitical challenges facing the United States is the dual confrontation with two powerful adversaries. One potential solution to this problem is to use cooperation to drive a wedge between them. Collaboration with China or Russia on divisive issues could strain the strategic partnership between the two competitors. However, the analysis reveals that there are relatively few such wedge issues.

Another argument in favor of cooperation is predicated on the idea that collaboration can generate a virtuous cycle in which cooperation begets more cooperation. The reasoning is that the trust that results from successful cooperation in one area can lead to a more amicable relationship. The gradual development of trust as a consequence of successful cooperation that extends to other areas may be one of the positive second-order effects. However, cooperation on issues within the trade space is likely to have both positive and negative second-order effects on other issues and U.S. allies and partners, which inevitably involves trade-offs.

Furthermore, evidence indicates that achieving these positive second-order effects may be challenging, at least in the short term. A few ostensibly successful cases of cooperation on national security issues, and mixed cases of cooperation on matters such as peace in the Middle East, the fight against piracy or terrorism, have possibly reduced friction between the great powers in specific areas, but they have not yet produced the desired side effect.

Ultimately, cooperation, even if feasible, has both advantages and costs, both direct and second-order. Great power cooperation can affect U.S. relations with other countries, for better or worse, as U.S. actions can be interpreted as either reducing tensions in the region or abandoning it in favor of a hostile power. U.S. decision-makers must carefully consider where and whether to attempt to partner with a particular competitor.

Final thoughts and key recommendations

The key takeaway from RAND’s analysis is that the opportunities for cooperation in national security between the United States, China, and Russia are limited and may be decreasing. In response to this bleak outlook, the U.S. must engage in cooperation with China and Russia in the few areas where it is possible, and prepare for long-term strategic competition.

While the notion of a big deal that could change the course of the great power game has some appeal, no such agreements are currently in sight.

Another often-discussed idea for cooperation is to leverage Russia to counter China, but there are a few potential wedge issues for this.